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Abstract. The order for payment procedure is a simplified procedure used in many member states of the EU. The procedure 
is highly formal and usually no substantial evidence is assessed in the course of the procedure. This is also the case in Estonia, 
where this procedure is used very frequently against consumers. The CJEU has, in several cases, assessed the national rules 
of Member States regarding the order for payment procedure and explained in which cases these rules are not in line with the 
purpose of the UCTD. In this article, Estonian legislation is used as an example to show that as the EU law does not address 
the order for payment procedure directly, the protection of consumers’ rights depends on the specificities of national 
procedural law. Even if the member state’s legislation is in compliance with the positions expressed by the CJEU, the order 
for payment procedure might not effectively ensure the protection required under the UCTD. This is so because, under the 
existing CJEU practice, the court does not have to demand submission of evidence, and sellers and suppliers can thus avoid 
the controls on unfairness in the standard terms quite easily. This paper also analyses whether it would be acceptable to fully 
delegate the order for payment procedure to computer systems including artificial intelligence, as it has been suggested to do 
in Estonia. 
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The order for payment procedure is a simplified procedure which is faster, easier, and cheaper than an action. In 
Estonia, the order for payment procedure involves filing a claim with a court for payment of a certain amount of 
money. The court then issues a proposal for payment to the opposing party on the basis of the claim and, if no 
objections are lodged against the proposal for payment, an order for payment is made which is subject to immediate 
enforcement. Only if the debtor objects to the proposal for payment will the procedure continue as an ordinary 
action (see the Code of Civil Procedure [CCIP], passed on 20 April 2005, entry into force on 1 January 2006 § 
481 ff). The order for payment procedure follows a similar path in many EU Member States (European 
Commission, 2017, p. 226). This procedure is characterised by a high degree of formality and the fact that, as a 
rule, no substantial evidence is assessed in the course of the procedure. In Estonia, this procedure has sometimes 
been described as a ‘post office duty’ which in the future could be performed by artificial intelligence (Mandri, 
2019). 
The order for payment procedure is a highly important and frequently used procedure in Estonia – in 2018 alone 
there were 32,403 order for payment procedures (Justiitsministeerium, 2018). There is no accurate overview of 
the number of cases of order for payment procedure which have been initiated against consumers, but this 
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procedure is certainly often used against consumers. In comparison, consumers approached the Consumer 
Disputes Committee in only 3246 instances in 2017 (Tarbijakaitseamet, 2018). Consequently, the order for 
payment procedure concerns a significantly larger number of consumers than the ADR (alternative dispute 
resolution) procedure for consumer disputes. 
In practice, the order for payment procedure often allows the creditors to successfully assert claims that are based 
on unfair contract terms. According to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), this is not in line with 
the purpose of Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) (Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 1993). The Court has concluded on several 
occasions, e.g. in cases Banco Español de Credito (Banco Español de Crédito SA v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, 
2012), Finanmadrid (Finanmadrid SA v. Jesús Vicente Albán Zambrano and Others, 2016), Profi Credit Polska 
(Profi Credit Polska S.A. w Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz Wawrzosek, 2016), PKO Bank Polski (Powszechna Kasa 
Oszczednosci [PKO] Bank Polski S.A. v. Jacek Michalski, 2018), and Bondora (Bondora AS v. Carlos V. C, XY, 
2019), that the national order for payment procedure rules in some Member States do not allow the court to assess 
the potential unfairness of the terms.  
As there are currently already several judgments of the CJEU relating to this topic, the Member States could be 
expected to know the extent to which courts should review standard terms in the course of the order for payment 
procedure, and to have introduced the respective amendments to their national legislation. This paper, however, 
aims to show, using the Estonian legislation as an example, that in a situation where the EU law does not address 
the order for payment procedure directly, protection of consumers’ rights depends on the specificities of national 
procedural law, and therefore the level of consumer protection based on the UCTD might not be uniform for all 
consumers in the EU. This should not be the case. Whereas the EU attempts to raise the level of protection of 
consumers’ rights within the framework of the New Deal (European Commission, 2018), providing, inter alia, 
penalties applicable in case of infringements of unfair contract terms, the rights of consumers in relation to unfair 
contract terms are actually protected in very different ways from one Member State to another. In addition, this 
article also demonstrates that the settlement of claims arising from consumer contracts cannot be fully delegated 
to computer systems, including artificial intelligence, and that for as long as the CJEU does not oblige courts to 
ask for evidence from the creditors there is nothing in reality to prevent creditors from asserting claims based on 
unfair terms against consumers. 
 
1. The Principle of Procedural Autonomy 
 
Effective consumer protection requires, in addition to substantive law rules, adequate procedural tools for 
enforcement (Trstenjak, 2013, p. 452). To date there are relatively few procedural law acts in the EU law, mostly 
due to the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States. According to this principle, national civil 
procedure law does not generally fall within the competence of the European legislator, and consequently the 
Member States are free to draw up these rules at their own discretion (Ebers, 2010, p. 825; Rösler, 2012, pp. 236, 
243). Nevertheless, this principle has not been absolute for some time already and in the Member States’ civil 
procedure and even the enforcement procedure there is a need to take into account the limits set by EU law 
(European Commission, 2019; van Duin & Leone, 2019, p. 24; Trstenjak, 2013, p. 453; Kalamees & Sein, 2017, 
p. 116) due to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see also Banco Español de Crédito, SA v. Joaquín 
Calderón Camino, 2012). The latter – meaning that domestic procedural rules should not make it impossible or 
excessively difficult to apply the protection granted to the consumers by the UCTD – has become especially 
important in the CJEU case law. This is because the UCTD seeks to (a) prevent a consumer from being bound by 
an unfair contract term (Art 6 of the UCTD), and (b) ensure that, in the interests of the consumers and of 
competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair contract terms in contracts 
concluded with consumers (Art 7 of the UCTD), while the principle of effectiveness means that the procedural 
rules of a Member State must not render the achievement of these aims impossible or excessively difficult (Jeroen 
van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, 1995). 
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The CJEU has stressed that every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural provision 
makes the application of European Union law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference 
to the role of that provision in the procedure, the progress of the procedure, and its special features, before the 
various national bodies (Banco Español de Crédito, SA v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, 2012). The following parts 
of this article are dedicated, first, to describing the cases where the CJEU has found that the national order for 
payment procedure makes the application of the UCTD rules impossible or excessively complicated. Thereafter, 
based on the CJEU case law, we evaluate the compliance of the Estonian national order for payment procedure 
rules with the EU law. 
 
2. Order for Payment Procedure Under Estonian Law 
 
2.1. Case Study 
 
In order to make it easier to understand the order for payment procedure in Estonia, the analysis set out in this 
article is based on the following case study. Paul has rented a Tesla Model S vehicle from OÜ X for four days. 
The company OÜ X is leasing different Tesla models, and the company enters into contracts with its clients using 
standard contract terms. Under the lease contract, Paul has to pay rent for the use of the car at €199 per day, i.e. 
€796 for four days. In addition, the contract contains a clause whereby Paul has to pay a contractual penalty of 
€100 for exceeding the speed limit by more than 40 km/h with the car, plus €10 per every 1 km/h by which the 
speed limit is exceeded (it is possible to lease the same car model on exactly the same terms in Estonia; see Tesla 
Rent, n.d.). 
 
Paul drives the car at the speed of 111 km/h in an area where the speed limit is 70 km/h. As the smart car records 
its speed and location, OÜ X requests Paul to pay, in addition to €796, the contractual penalty in the amount of 
€510 (100+41x10) when the car is returned. Paul refuses to pay anything at all to OÜ X, and OÜ X decides to 
claim €1,306 from Paul via the order for payment procedure. 
Estonian law does not have a specific provision stipulating that a standard term introducing a certain amount of 
contractual penalty is invalid. Pursuant to clause 42 (3) 5) of the Law of Obligations Act (passed on 26 September 
2001, entry into force on 1 July 2002), a standard term is considered to be invalid in a consumer contract if it 
obliges the consumer, in the event of non-performance of the consumer’s obligations, to pay an unreasonably high 
contractual penalty to the party using the term, or an unreasonably high predetermined amount of compensation 
for damages or other compensation. The contractual penalty agreed between Paul and OÜ X in the standard terms 
does not have the function of compensation for damage (as regards different functions of the contractual penalty 
in Estonian law, see Varul et al., 2016, p. 810), as the obligation to pay the penalty for exceeding the speed limit 
is up to Paul, and not OÜ X, to perform (Traffic Act, passed on 17 June 2010, entry into force on 1 July 2011). 
However, such a contractual penalty has a preventive purpose, i.e. OÜ X uses the respective term to prevent Paul 
from exceeding the speed limit while driving the car. In order to assess whether the given contractual penalty is 
unfair, it must be assessed how severe the violation is, what the economic position of the parties is, their interest 
in the performance, etc. (Varul et al., 2016, p. 826) in short – how justified the collection of the respective amount 
is (Varul et al., 2016, p. 234). Considering that the car is rented at the price of €199 per day, and that the exceeding 
of the speed limit does not present any significant consequences to OÜ X, it can be concluded that the contractual 
penalty agreed under the contract between Paul and OÜ X is unreasonably high, and the respective standard term 
is therefore invalid.  
If OÜ X filed its claim against Paul in an action, the court hearing the action would have the ex officio obligation 
to determine the validity of the respective standard term pursuant to the EU law (Pannon GSM Zrt v. Erzsébet 
Sustikné Győrfi, 2009; VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt v. Ferenc Schneider, 2010), and the claim of OÜ X for contractual 
penalty would not be satisfied. From the viewpoint of Estonian law, this is a matter of applying the law, which is 
a task that the court performs regardless of the parties’ pleadings (the so-called iura novit curia principle; Kalamees 
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& Sein, 2017, p. 118). This would ensure the protection of Paul as a consumer against unfair standard terms. Is 
the situation the same if OÜ X decides to file its claims against Paul via the order for payment procedure? 
 
2.2. Petition for Payment Order 
 
In Estonia, the order for payment procedure is a formalised online procedure for the collection of monetary claims 
in the amount of up to €6400. A respective petition for the initiation of the procedure shall be filed digitally via an 
electronic environment www.etoimik.ee (subsection 482 [4] of the CCIP). The petition cannot be filed in any other 
manner than electronically (an application for the European order for payment can also be filed on paper pursuant 
to Article 7 [5] of Regulation [EC] No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 creating a European order for payment procedure). In the e-toimik environment, the required fields in the 
form provided are to be filled in order to file the petition for the payment order. 
The data which must be presented in the petition for the payment order are not many and they are not detailed. 
Under subsection 482 (1) of the CCIP, the petition shall set out: the data of the parties and their representatives; 
the data of the court with which the petition is filed; the sum of money claimed (the main claim and any collateral 
claims shall be set out separately, and in case a penalty interest for late payment is calculated, the rate of the 
interest for late payment and the period for which it is calculated shall be indicated); a short description of the 
circumstances which constitute the basis for the claim; a short description of the evidence, which the petitioner 
would be able to use in an action in proof of the claim; confirmation that the claim is due and does not depend on 
the performance of a mutual obligation, or that such obligation has been performed; confirmation that the petitioner 
has presented the information honestly and according to his or her best knowledge, and that he or she is aware of 
the fact that presentation, knowingly, of false information to the court may result in criminal liability; and the 
particulars of the court which, according to jurisdiction, is authorised to deal in an action with the claim which is 
the object of the order for payment. 
In the case described above, OÜ X should therefore set out data regarding itself and Paul in the petition for the 
payment order. Further, OÜ X has to set out the amount of the main claim against Paul (€796) in the respective 
field, and select the type of document on which the claim is based from the menu (e.g. contract, invoice, call letter, 
reminder, order, or other). As for the contractual penalty, OÜ X has to select in the menu that it claims the 
contractual penalty and enter the amount of the contractual penalty (€510).  
Next, OÜ X has to select the type of the basis of the claim from the menu – in the given case it would be the 
contract for use – and add a specifying description, for example, the title of the contract. In addition, the petitioner 
shall also enter in the system a short description of the circumstances which constitute the basis for the claim. The 
person filing the petition may set out the specific provisions of the contract under which the debt has occurred, but 
is not required to do so (the situations where a specific provision is submitted to the court are very rare in Estonia). 
In the given case, let us assume that OÜ X will copy the relevant provisions of the contract into the information 
system, and add the information that Paul has not paid the rent in time and has violated his contractual obligations 
by exceeding the speed limit. 
Then, OÜ X has to present a list of the evidence which it would be able to use in order to substantiate its claim in 
the action. At least one piece of evidence shall be indicated while filing the petition. The evidence itself is not 
appended to the form by the petitioner.  
 
Thereafter, OÜ X must confirm that the claim is due and is not dependant on the performance of a mutual 
obligation, or that the mutual obligation has been performed, and that it has submitted the data in a truthful way 
and is aware of the potential criminal liability for submission of incorrect information. 
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2.3. Resolution of Petition for the Payment Order 
 
2.3.1. What Does the Court Assess? 
 
The court shall resolve a petition for the payment order within 10 working days after the receipt thereof (subsection 
483 [1] of the CCIP). It is a formal process and no determination of the substance is carried out (Judgment of the 
Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, 2014c, p. 13). The verification of submitted data is extensively automated 
due to the use of the electronic system for filing of data. The whole system has been set up in such manner that it 
would not be possible to file the petition for the payment order unless the required fields specified in the previous 
chapter had been filled in.  
 
If the petition is accepted and there are no grounds for dismissal, the court issues a proposal for payment. A petition 
for the payment order can be denied only in limited cases, as set out in subsection 483 (2) of the CCIP.  
Under subsection 481 (1) of the CCIP, the petition is denied if the claim is not based on a private law relationship, 
is not seeking to obtain payment of a certain sum of money, or is not due. Furthermore, as a rule, a claim may not 
be noncontractual, be seeking to obtain compensation for immaterial damage, or be directed against a bankrupt 
person (Kõve et al., 2018, p. 171). As in our case OÜ X has a contractual claim against Paul and Paul is not 
bankrupt, the respective claim can be resolved by the order for payment procedure. 
Pursuant to subsection 481 (22) of the CCIP, the order for payment procedure may not be used for claims over 
€6400 (the main claim and collateral claims in total), which is not exceeded in our case. 
A petition for the payment order is also not accepted insofar as the amount of collateral claims exceeds that of the 
main claim (subsection 481 [21] of the CCIP). If the amount of collateral claims still exceeds the amount of the 
main claim, the petitioner can claim collateral claims by the order for payment procedure only to the extent not 
exceeding the main claim. The objective of this provision is to restrict award of usurious collateral claims namely 
in the case of consumer contracts, and thereby provide more protection to consumers (Kõve et al., 2018, p. 159). 
In the given case, there is no problem with meeting this prerequisite, as the main claim amounts to €796 and the 
contractual penalty claimed from Paul by OÜ X amounts to €510.  
It is important to note that the validity of the contractual penalty clause is not assessed here. Even if the contractual 
penalty clause agreed upon between Paul and OÜ X is an evidently unfair standard term, the petition for the 
payment order cannot be denied on this ground, as the absolute amount of the contractual penalty claimed by OÜ 
X does not exceed the amount of the main claim. 
Under Estonian order for payment procedure law, it is possible to carry out the unfairness control of standard terms 
only to a very restricted extent.3 The only exception is clause 481 (23) 2) of the CCIP, according to which a petition 
for the payment order shall be denied if the rate of interest for late payment agreed on with the consumer exceeds 
triple the rate of interest for late payment provided for by law (a petition for the payment order can also be denied 
in case the parties have agreed on an excessively high interest rate in a contract (CCIP § 481 [23] 1), but in such 
a case it does not constitute a substantive review of standard terms). The given restriction has been inspired by the 
judgment on Banco Español de Crédito SA, whereby the courts of Member States must have the opportunity to 
assess the unfair nature of standard terms containing the rate of interest for late payment (Banco Español de 
Crédito, SA v. Joaquin Calderon Camino, 2012). The triple amount of interest for late payment, as provided for 
by law, derives from the position of the Estonian Supreme Court that a standard term in a consumer contract 
whereby the agreed rate of interest for late payment exceeds three times the statutory rate of interest for late 
payment is invalid (Judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, 2016, p 13). Therefore, if standard 
 
3 It has to be noted that some questions related to the permitting of the petition for the payment order are not a matter of 
unfairness control of standard terms, but are regulated directly in the CCIP. One example of this would be an agreement 
between a seller or a supplier and a consumer conferring jurisdiction to the court in the territorial jurisdiction of which the 
trader has their principal place of business. This kind of agreement is invalid according to CCIP § 106 (1). 
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terms include an arrangement on an interest for late payment rate exceeding the respective rate, it is obvious that 
the respective standard term is invalid. The purpose of clause 481 (23) 2) of the CCIP has been to align the Estonian 
order for payment procedure with the EU law (Kõve et al., 2018, p. 152). This attempt has been successful in part, 
as claims cannot be enforced in the course of the order for payment procedure based on an evidently invalid 
arrangement on interest for late payment. However, while returning to the example specified in this article, clause 
481 (23) 2) of the CCIP does not prevent OÜ X from claiming an unreasonably large contractual penalty from 
Paul. 
After the judgment on Banco Español de Crédito SA, the academics of Estonia wondered whether this judgment 
meant that the entire order for payment procedure would vanish, or whether at least the procedural rules should be 
significantly changed (Kõve, 2012, p. 671; Sein, 2013, p. 40). However, the Estonian order for payment procedure 
has undergone relatively minor changes after the judgment on Banco Español de Crédito SA, and the procedure 
itself has not changed to a considerable extent. The amendments to the CCIP at the beginning of 2018 only touch 
on a situation where claims based on standard terms provide for an excessive rate of interest for late payment. The 
amendment of the CCIP does not provide for any possibility for determining the unfairness of any other standard 
terms (Kõve et al., 2018, p. 143), as is also illustrated by the case study on OÜ X and Paul.  
 
2.3.2. Who Resolves the Petitions? 
 
When a petition for the payment order is received via the electronic system, it will be resolved by an assistant 
judge (subsection 4892 [1] of the CCIP; Kõve et al., 2018, p. 230. Misleading information on this is set out in: 
European Commission, 2017, p. 227 where it is stated that in Estonia, the matters of the order for payment 
procedure are heard by a judge). Pursuant to subsection 114 (1) of the Courts Act (passed on 19 June 2002, entry 
into force on 29 July 2002), an assistant judge is a court official who performs the duties specified by law. 
Therefore, it is not a judge who would be able to apply law (Judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, 
2014a, p 44.6; Judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, 2014b, p 59). An assistant judge verifies the 
compliance of a petition with the requirements of § 481 of the CCIP only formally, i.e. whether the respective data 
are set out in the petition, whereas the correctness of the data is to be presumed (Kõve et al., 2018, p. 172).  
 
The competence of an assistant judge in the resolution of matters of the order for payment procedure has been 
found to be problematic in the Estonian legal literature (Kõve et al., 2018, p. 232). The main reason behind this is 
that an assistant judge has no competence to apply law. Therefore, an assistant judge should not assess any 
circumstances which have an important bearing on the administration of justice, such as the invalidity of standard 
terms. Subsection 595 (2) of the CCIP still requires an assistant judge to refer the making of a decision to the judge 
in more complicated matters. For example, an assistant judge shall refer the making of a ruling to a judge if the 
law of another state is to be applied, legal complications become evident when reviewing a petition, or if in the 
opinion of the assistant judge, the provision subject to application is contrary to the Constitution or European 
Union law. In the light of UCTD, this provision should be interpreted in such a manner that, in case the invalidity 
of a standard term is clear to an assistant judge, he or she shall refer the making of a ruling to the judge in the 
course of the order for payment procedure (according to the commented CCIP, there are no rules which would 
enable one to ascertain whether a case is legally complicated or not. Therefore, the decision on whether a case 
should be referred to a judge is made by the assistant judge. Also, the referral of a case to a judge on the suspicion 
that an applicable provision is in conflict with the EU law does not mean that there is certainly a conflict, and a 
suspicion is a sufficient reason for referral. See Kõve et al., 2018, p. 753). The Estonian judge then has the right 
to assess the validity of a standard term (Kõve et al., 2017, p. 1007, 1010) and, if invalidity is determined, not to 
make a proposal for a payment order or an order for payment (CCIP subsections 463 [2] and 436 [1] are applicable, 
according to which the ruling of the court has to be legitimate, see note 52, p. 1260. The situation is also similar 
to the German ZPO that has been a source of inspiration for the Estonian legislator, see Musielak & Voit, 2019, 
ZPO § 691, 2). 
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The court’s right to act in the manner described is also supported by subsection 4891 (2) of the CCIP, according to 
which, in an appeal against the order for payment, the debtor may rely on the fact that the claim for whose 
collection the corresponding proceedings were conducted is clearly unfounded. If the claim is founded on an 
invalid standard term, then there exists a ground for annulling the order for payment and the district court has an 
obligation to annul such a payment order (subsection 4891 [4] of the CCIP). It would be unthinkable that the first 
instance should have an obligation to make an order for payment that is based on a clearly invalid standard term 
and is without a doubt annullable by the district court. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the regulation of the 
CCIP on the court’s right to assess the validity of standard terms is definitely neither clear nor unambiguous.  
The right to refer the making of a ruling to a judge is not a widely used practice by the assistant judges in the 
course of this procedure (Kõve et al., 2018, p. 233). This means that it is not very likely in the course of the order 
for payment procedure that a petition for the payment order would be denied for the reason that the underlying 
claim is based on an unfair standard term.  
The issue of who is competent to resolve petitions for the order of payment procedure has been elaborated on by 
the Court of Justice in the case EOS KSI Slovensko s.r.o v. Jan Danko, Margarita Dankova (2018). In this case, 
the petition for the order for payment was resolved by an officer of the court, and not by a judge, in accordance 
with Slovenian law. However, differently from Estonian law, the respective officer had the right to assess the 
potentially unfair nature of the standard terms of the contract underlying the order for payment. According to the 
CJEU, the effectiveness of the UCTD is not limited by the fact that the order for payment procedure is carried out 
by court officials and not by judges as long as the court is able to determine the potential invalidity of the standard 
terms, either upon enforcement of the order for payment or in case the consumer files an objection in the course 
of the procedure (EOS KSI Slovensko s.r.o v. Jan Danko, Margarita Dankova, 2018). CJEU underlines that it was 
necessary for ensuring the effectiveness of the UCTD that national legislation would not make the submission of 
objections so complicated that the consumer would rather give up the respective right (EOS KSI Slovensko s.r.o v. 
Jan Danko, Margarita Dankova, 2018). Essentially, the CJEU has held in this judgment that even the unfairness 
control of standard terms by an officer of the court does not ensure sufficient protection for consumers, and it is 
necessary that the judge would still be able to assess the potential unfairness at some procedural stage (European 
Commission, 2019, p. 63). 
While evaluating the national law in the light of this judgment, it can be concluded that Estonian law is in 
compliance with the UCTD as regards the person conducting the procedure. The CCIP does not allow the assistant 
judge to decide on the validity of standard terms, but enables him or her to refer the order for payment procedure 
to a judge if, in his or her opinion, the applicable provision is contrary to the EU law, or if legal complications 
arise in the hearing of the matter. Furthermore, the filing of an objection is a lot easier for a consumer under the 
CCIP than under Slovenian law (see Chapter 5.2.2., and regarding Slovenian law case EOS KSI Slovensko s.r.o v. 
Jan Danko, Margarita Dankova, 2018). 
 
2.3.3. Making Proposal for Payment and Order for Payment 
  
If the court grants the petition for the payment order, the court makes a proposal for payment by an order 
(subsection 484 [1] of the CCIP), and delivers the proposal for payment and a form for an objection to the debtor, 
and also informs the petitioner of the forwarding of the proposal for payment (subsection 484 [3]). A proposal for 
payment is actually the court’s call to the debtor to pay the requested amount or to file objections to the claim 
(Kõve et al., 2018, p. 180). In this stage of the order for payment procedure the court, as a rule, does not determine 
the circumstances related to the claim, including the potential unfairness of standard terms.  
If the debtor does not file an objection to the proposal for payment and does not pay the amount indicated in the 
proposal for payment, the court issues an order for payment for the collection of the respective amount (subsection 
489 [1] of the CCIP). As a rule, the court does not determine the substance of the claim before issuing the order 
for payment either. The order for payment is subject to immediate enforcement regardless of the service of the 
payment order on the debtor (subsection 489 [7] of the CCIP). Therefore, if the debtor does not file any objections 
to the proposal for payment and the assistant judge has not referred the matter to the judge for the unfairness 
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control of a standard term, the court never actually assesses the substance of the claim in the course of the 
procedure. Thus, the claim of OÜ X against Paul would be granted without any determination of the substance of 
the claim, irrespective of the fact that it is partially based on an unfair and invalid standard term.  
 
3. Compliance of Estonian Rules for Order for Payment Procedure with the Case Law of the CJEU  
 
3.1. Cases Where the Unfairness of Standard Terms is Evident  
 
It has been emphasized already in the decision of 2012 on the case Banco Español de Crédito SA (Banco Español 
de Crédito, SA v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, 2012) that the specific type of procedure and the rules of procedure 
must not prevent courts from reviewing the contents of unfair standard terms (Beka, 2018, p. 240). In this 
judgement, the CJEU stated that:  
 
the court before which an application for an order for payment has been bought should have the right to assess 
of its own motion, in limini litis or at any other stage during the proceedings, whether a term concerning interest 
on late payments contained in a contract concluded between a seller or a supplier and a consumer is unfair, in 
the case where that consumer has not lodged an objection. The court has such a right when it already has the 
legal and factual elements necessary for that task available to it (Banco Español de Crédito, SA v. Joaquín 
Calderón Camino, 2012).  
 
Consequently, the CJEU concluded that a national court had to have the right to assess whether a standard term 
was invalid, and also declare the respective term invalid in the course of the order for payment procedure, if the 
unfair nature of the standard term was clear (Trstenjak, 2013, p. 472; Musielak & Voit, 2019, ZPO § 691, p. 2). 
At the same time, the national court has the right to act ex officio and without any initiative from the consumer 
(Musielak & Voit, 2019, ZPO § 688, p. 2). After the court ascertains that such a standard term exists, it may refuse 
to issue an order for payment. It is important to keep in mind that in the judgment on Banco Español de Crédito 
SA, the court concluded that national courts must have the right to determine the validity of standard terms, but 
did not state that the court had the obligation to do so. However, it can be concluded from this judgment that the 
national order for payment procedure must enable the courts to determine the potential invalidity of standard terms 
of its own motion if no additional circumstances need to be ascertained for this purpose (Musielak & Voit, 2019, 
ZPO § 691, p. 2; Kalamees & Sein, 2017, p. 120). 
 
In 2016, the CJEU specified the relationship between the order for payment procedure and UCTD in the case of 
Finanmadrid (Finanmadrid EFC SA v. Jesús Vicente Albán Zambrano and others, 2016). In the respective 
judgment, the CJEU expressed the view that the national rules for the order for payment procedure, which did not 
enable the court that carried out the order for payment procedure or the court that made a decision on the 
enforceability to assess ex officio the invalidity of the standard terms regarding the enforceability of an order for 
payment, were not in compliance with the UCTD (Finanmadrid EFC SA v. Jesús Vicente Albán Zambrano and 
others, 2016). It follows that, in the opinion of the CJEU, the national court must have the right to determine the 
validity of standard terms in at least some stage of the order for payment procedure. It should be clear from the 
data set out in the petition for the payment order filed against Paul by OÜ X that the claim is based on an unfair 
standard term. As Estonian law enables an assistant judge to refer the making of a ruling to a judge who will be 
able to determine the invalidity of the standard term and deny the issue of the order for payment, the Estonian 
rules for the order for payment procedure are per se in compliance with the UCTD (Kõve et al., 2018, p. 145).   
Therefore, even if Paul does not file an objection to the proposal for payment, the Estonian court will be able to 
assess the potentially (in truth already quite clear) unfair nature of the terms of the contract between Paul and OÜ 
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3.2. Cases Where the Unfairness of Standard Terms is not Evident 
 
3.2.1. CJEU Case Law  
 
3.2.1.1 National Order for Payment Procedure 
 
The situation is more complicated in cases where the claim is based on a standard term, in which unfairness is not 
clear to the court. In practice such cases are prevailing in the Estonian order for payment procedure. As stated in 
clause 3.2., pursuant to the CCIP the petitioner is not obliged to file with the court a contract or a term of a contract 
underlying its claim against the consumer. Furthermore, many claims filed in the order for payment procedure are 
based on an acknowledgement of obligation. By an acknowledgement of obligation, a consumer may acknowledge 
the existence of an obligation deriving from an invalid standard term. For example, Paul signs an 
acknowledgement of obligation where he acknowledges that he owes €1306 to OÜ X: here the unfairness of the 
term is not evident to the court. Or OÜ X simply does not copy the contract terms into the petition for the payment 
order: also, here it is not clear to the court that the claim is based on a partially invalid standard term.  
 
The CJEU has explained its views on a similar situation in the cases Profi Credit Polska S.A (Profi Credit Polska 
S.A. w Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz Wawrzosek, 2016) and PKO Bank Polski S.A (Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci 
(PKO) Bank Polski S.A v. Jacek Michalski, 2018). The judgment on Profi Credit Polska S.A. concerned a situation 
where a Polish creditor gave a loan to a consumer. The standard-form agreement contained a clause requiring the 
consumer to issue a promissory note as a security for the creditor’s claims for repayment. The promissory note 
signed by the consumer did not contain a specified amount (Profi Credit Polska S.A. w Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz 
Wawrzosek, 2016). When the consumer did not return the loan on time, the creditor informed the consumer that it 
had indicated the outstanding loan amount on the promissory note, and filed a petition for the payment order with 
a court against the consumer. The creditor appended the promissory note signed by the consumer and the 
documents regarding the termination of the credit agreement to its petition (Profi Credit Polska S.A. w Bielsku 
Bialej v. Mariusz Wawrzosek, 2016).  
 
The Polish court hearing the matter explained in the reference for a preliminary ruling that, although the standard 
terms were not included in the documents filed with the court, the court was aware of the fact that the consumer 
had assumed the obligation to sign the promissory note described above. Pursuant to Polish law, the court is 
entitled to assess only whether the promissory note meets the formal requirements in the first stage of the order 
for payment procedure. In the second stage of the procedure, the consumer may file an objection which may 
concern the issues related to the promissory note as well as the contract due to which the promissory note has been 
issued, including the potentially unfair nature of such a contract. Differently from the situations in the cases of 
Banco Español de Crédito and Finanmadrid, the Polish court could therefore not assess the unfairness of the 
standard terms based on the documents submitted to it, and the promissory note submitted to the court met all the 
formal requirements.  
Based on the circumstances described, the Polish court filed a reference for a preliminary ruling with the CJEU,  
asking whether the provisions of national law, enabling the issue of an order for payment based on a formally 
appropriate promissory note in such a manner that the court conducting the procedure was not able to assess the 
potential conflict of the terms of the consumer credit agreement underlying the claim with the UCTD, were 
contrary to the rules of Articles 6 (1) and 7 (1) of the UCTD (Profi Credit Polska S.A. w Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz 
Wawrzosek, 2016). It is also important to note that under Polish procedural law it is possible to assess the unfair 
nature of standard terms if the consumer files an objection in the course of the procedure. 
Before the respective analysis of the rules, the CJEU underlined the necessity of assessing the procedure as a 
whole, not only separate provisions, while evaluating the national procedural law (Profi Credit Polska S.A. w 
Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz Wawrzosek, 2016). Further, the CJEU held that in order to assess whether the contested 
procedural rules would enable them to ensure effective protection of the consumers’ rights, it was to be assessed 
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whether the rules for submission of an objection as prescribed by national law would create a risk that the 
consumers might not file objections (Profi Credit Polska S.A. w Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz Wawrzosek, 2016). 
While analysing the Polish law, the CJEU concluded that such a risk existed, as the conditions of filing an objection 
were hindering for the consumer – the consumer may file an objection within two weeks, the consumer must also 
explain in the objection whether he or she objects to the order for payment in full or in part, the consumer must 
specify why the order for payment should not be issued, and the consumer must present facts and evidence (Profi 
Credit Polska S.A. w Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz Wawrzosek, 2016). In addition, in case of filing an objection, the 
Polish consumer is obliged to pay three quarters of the state fee, and the undertaking party has to pay the remaining 
quarter. The CJEU stated that the obligation to pay the state fee alone, especially in such an amount, may prevent 
consumers from filing objections (Profi Credit Polska S.A. w Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz Wawrzosek, 2016). Other 
nuances of the procedure, such as the short term and expense of submitting objections and the consumers’ lack of 
knowledge of their rights, have the same effect (Profi Credit Polska S.A. w Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz Wawrzosek, 
2016). In conclusion, the CJEU stated that the national law provisions allowing the issuing of an order for payment 
on the basis of a promissory note in such a way that the court does not have the opportunity to assess the potentially 
unfair nature of standard terms, and complicating the submission of objections for consumers, were contrary to 
the UTCD.  The CJEU repeated essentially the same position in its judgment on Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci 
(PKO) Bank Polski S.A. (Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci [PKO] Bank Polski S.A v. Jacek Michalski, 2018).  
Consequently, the CJEU has concluded that if the invalidity of a standard term is not clear to a court, and the court 
cannot verify the validity of the standard terms of its own motion in the course of the order for payment procedure, 
the rights of a consumer are still sufficiently protected pursuant to the UCTD if the consumer has the opportunity 
to file objections in the course of the procedure (Profi Credit Polska S.A. w Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz Wawrzosek, 
2016; Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci [PKO] Bank Polski S.A v. Jacek Michalski, 2018). However, such 
opportunities for the filing of objections must not intimidate consumers from using the respective opportunity, and 
after the objections are filed the court of the Member State must have the opportunity to assess the nature of the 
standard terms. At the same time, the CJEU did not state in these cases that the court of a Member State should 
have the obligation to require the submission of the documents underlying the claim in case of a suspicion 
regarding the validity of the standard terms (see e.g. Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci [PKO] Bank Polski S.A v. 
Jacek Michalski, 2018). 
CJEU altered its position in 2019 in Profi Credit Polska S.A. (No. 2; Joined cases C-419/18 and C-483/18 Profi 
Credit Polska S.A., 2019). This case again involved several Polish consumers, who had concluded consumer credit 
contracts with the creditor under which the payment of the debts was secured by the issuance of an incomplete 
promissory note. If the consumer failed to comply with their contractual obligations, Profi Credit Polska completed 
the notes by entering an amount on them, and brought before the court an application seeking the payment of the 
sum indicated on the promissory note (Joined cases C-419/18 and C-483/18 Profi Credit Polska S.A., 2019). 
According to Polish law, the court may verify whether the promissory note has been completed in accordance with 
the agreement concluded only in the event of an objection raised by the debtor (Joined cases C-419/18 and C-
483/18 Profi Credit Polska S.A., 2019). In the current case the consumers had not filed an objection. The creditor 
took the position that they were not obliged to provide any other documentation than the promissory note (Joined 
cases C-419/18 and C-483/18 Profi Credit Polska S.A., 2019). The referring court was, however, aware of the 
terms of the credit agreement because one of the defendants in the main proceedings had taken action which 
allowed the court to see the actual contract (Joined cases C-419/18 and C-483/18 Profi Credit Polska S.A., 2019), 
and therefore raised serious doubts about the standard terms used being unfair and invalid. 
Having these facts in mind, the referring courts asked whether Articles 6 (1) and 7 (1) of the UCTD must be 
interpreted as meaning that where a national court in the order for payment proceedings has serious doubts as to 
the merits of and application based on a promissory note, that court must examine of its own motion whether the 
provisions of the contract are unfair and may require the seller or supplier to produce documents recording those 
provisions (Joined cases C-419/18 and C-483/18 Profi Credit Polska S.A., 2019). Differently from the previous 
Profi Credit Polska S.A. case, the referring court here stressed its serious doubts about the validity of the terms of 
the contract underlying the promissory note. 
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The CJEU took the position that, in case of serious doubts as to the merits of the application, the UCTD requires 
that the court should be able to ask for documents on which the application is based, including the promissory note 
agreement (Joined cases C-419/18 and C-483/18 Profi Credit Polska S.A., 2019). 
Therefore, the CJEU has clarified its previous positions and stated that even if the invalidity of the standard term 
is not evident to the court, but the court has serious doubts about the validity of the terms, the court has to have 
the right to ask for additional documents from the creditor. While doing so the court does not need to wait for the 
consumer to file an objection. 
 
3.2.1.2 European Payment Order 
 
Until December 2019, the CJEU case law on order for payment procedure and on the UCTD discussed only the 
matters related to Member States’ national law. On 19 December 2019, the court made a judgement in Joined 
cases C-453/18 and C-494/18 Bondora AS v. Carlos V.C., XY (2019), where it analysed the national courts’ right 
to request additional information from the creditor relating to the terms of the agreement in order to examine ex 
officio the fairness of the terms of the contract invoked as a basis for European Payment Order (EPO). 
 
The Estonian registered company Bondora AS lodged applications for the EPO before two Spanish courts. As the 
defendant in both of these cases was a consumer, the courts requested from Bondora AS the loan agreement in 
order to assess the fairness of contractual terms on which the application for an EPO was made. Bondora AS 
refused to provide the contract, arguing that Article 7 (2) of EPO regulation (Regulation No. 1896/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure) 
does not prescribe the creditors the submission of any documentation to issue an EPO. This obligation also does 
not arise from the Spanish national law regarding the EPO. The Spanish courts, on the contrary, found that they 
have the power to make such requests.  
In light of the previous facts, the CJEU answered the question of whether Article 7 (2) (d) and (e) of the EPO 
regulation and Articles 6 (1) and (1) of the UCTD must be interpreted as allowing the court in the context of the 
EPO procedure to request from the creditor additional information relating to the terms of the agreement between 
the creditor and the consumer, in order to carry out an ex officio review of the possible unfairness of those terms 
(Regulation No. 1896/2006). In its reasoning the CJEU referred to C-176/17 Profi Credit Polska and the position 
stated there: that the national legislation permitting the issue of an order for payment where the court does not 
have the right to examine the possible unfairness of the terms is not in line with the purposes of the UCTD 
(Regulation No. 1896/2006). The same principle also applies when a court receives an application for an EPO 
(Regulation No. 1896/2006). The court’s right to request additional documentation from the creditor follows from 
Articles 7(1) and 9(1) of the Regulation No. 1896/2006. On the basis of this reasoning, the CJEU concluded that 
the court, in the context of the EPO procedure, is allowed to request from the creditor additional information 
relating to the terms of the agreement in order to carry out ex officio review of the possible unfairness of those 
terms (Regulation No. 1896/2006). 
By this judgement the CJEU seems to have taken another step forward regarding the court’s right to ex officio 
examine the possible unfairness of standard terms. If in Profi Credit Polska S.A. (No. 2; Joined cases C-419/18 
and C-483/18 Profi Credit Polska S.A., 2019), the CJEU was of the opinion that the ground for requesting 
additional documentation lies in a court’s serious doubt about the standard terms being unfair, then in Bondora 
there is no such limitation mentioned. However, it has to be borne in mind that Bondora is a case based on the 
Regulation No. 1896/2006, and making general assumptions about the Member States’ order for payment 
procedure might therefore be too far reaching. At the same time, it does seem that the two procedures should not 
differ much with regard to UCTD, as the goal in both cases should be the protection of consumers’ rights. 
Therefore, some conclusions for national order for payment procedures could probably be drawn from the Bondora 
judgement as well.  
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In this case the CJEU has been of the opinion that the courts have the right to request the contract from the creditor 
in order to assess the fairness of the terms. There have been opinions expressed that the courts might also be 
obliged to make such requests from the creditors (Mariottini, 2019). As said before, this obligation is not obvious 
from the judgement itself, but the reasoning of the judgement definitely leaves room for such interpretation 
regarding the EPO procedure. Whether a similar obligation would also be applicable in case of national order for 
payment procedure remains to be seen. 
 
3.2.2. Compliance of Estonian Rules on Order for Payment Procedure with CJEU Case Law 
 
Keeping in mind the judgments regarding Polish law as described above, it should be ascertained, in order to assess 
whether the Estonian procedural law provisions are in compliance with the Directive, under which conditions 
consumers have the opportunity to submit objections to a proposal for payment.  
 
Under subsection 485 (1) of the CCIP, a debtor has to file an objection within 15 days after the day of service of 
the proposal for payment on the debtor. At the same time, the law does not stipulate any specific formal 
requirements for filing an objection. It is sufficient that the debtor files an objection on the form annexed to the 
proposal for payment, or in any other form, e.g. in writing or electronically. It is important to note that an objection 
need not be substantiated (subsection 485 [2] of the CCIP): it is sufficient if the debtor explains in the objection 
that the debtor does not agree to pay the amount set out in the proposal for payment. Consequently, similarly to 
the Polish system for the order for payment, the Estonian consumers also have the opportunity to file an objection 
within a relatively short time frame (the time limit of 15 days for the filing of objections has been deemed to be 
too short by the CJEU, for example in the case EOS KSI Slovensko s.r.o v. Jan Danko, Margarita Dankova, 2018, 
although this was in a situation where the consumer had to substantiate their objection. See also the European 
Commission, 2019, p. 66). However, differently from the Polish procedure, the Estonian consumers need not 
substantiate the objection or to prove any circumstances which constitute a basis for filing the objection (it has 
been concluded with regard to German law, for example, that the time limit of two weeks for filing of objections 
is in compliance with the principle of effective protection of rights deriving from the UCTD, if the consumer is 
not required to use the assistance of attorneys for filing of the objection, or to incur any related expenses, see 
EuGH, 2012). 
Also, with regard to the payment of state fee, Estonian law is more beneficial to consumers than the respective 
provisions of Polish law. It is provided for in subsection 147 (5) of the CCIP that, upon change of the order for 
payment procedure into action, a supplementary state fee is paid on the action to the extent that is not covered by 
the state fee paid on the filing of a petition for the payment order. The missing part of the state fee is to be paid by 
the creditor, not by the consumer (Kõve et al., 2018, p. 201). In the case of Paul and OÜ X, OÜ X claims payment 
of €1306 from Paul. The full rate of the state fee for the given value of civil matter is €200 (State Fees Act, passed 
on 10 December 2014, entry into force on 1 January 2015, partially from 1 January 2018. Annex 1 ‘State Fee 
Rates for Filing of Petitions in Judicial Proceedings (in euros)’), of which €45 had to be paid by OÜ X already 
upon filing the petition for the payment order (the state fee for filing a petition for the payment order is 3% of the 
claim, but not less than €45).  
In conclusion, the conditions for the filing of an objection in the course of the order for payment procedure are 
significantly less burdensome for Estonian consumers than under the Polish law. However, it cannot be clearly 
concluded that Estonian procedure is in compliance with the requirements of the UCTD in this respect. Firstly, 
Estonian consumers have only one more day to file objections than the Polish consumers. Secondly, there is still 
a considerable risk that the consumers will not file objections as they are not aware of their right to file objections, 
do not understand its importance in the course of the procedure, or are not able to do it due to the lack of evidence 
submitted by the petitioner (these are the risks referred to by the Court of Justice in its judgment Profi Credit 
Polska S.A. w Bielsku Bialej v. Mariusz Wawrzosek, 2016). The Estonian court has to inform the consumer, while 
making the proposal for payment, that the consumer has 15 days to file an objection (clause 484 [2] 3) of the 
Piia KALAMEES, Karin SEIN 





CCIP),4 and the court also attaches the form for filing an objection to the proposal for payment, where the 
conditions for and consequences of filing an objection are explained. This should be sufficient for the consumer 
to understand the importance of filing an objection and the consequences of filing or not filing an objection (it is 
still questionable whether the explanations provided on the document are clear enough and sufficiently 
understandable for the average consumer to decide upon the filing of the objection). However, for as long as there 
is no judgment of CJEU which would explain the same issues as are covered by the Estonian rules, or EU 
legislation regulating the issue, it cannot be regarded to be absolutely certain. This is also suggested by the fact 
that, despite the simplicity of the procedure of filing an objection, debtors do not file objections actively in Estonia 
(Kõve et al., 2018, p. 191). The situation with the submission of objections is also similar in other EU Member 
States (European Commission, 2019, p. 226; Rott, 2012, p. 474). 
If the order for payment procedure continues as an action after the filing of an objection, the court hearing the 
matter must provide the petitioner the opportunity to file a claim and substantiate it in the form prescribed for a 
statement of claim (subsection 487 [1] of the CCIP). The statement of claim must clearly indicate the amount of 
the claim and also the factual circumstances underlying the claim (§ 363 of the CCIP). In addition, the evidence 
in proof of the circumstances underlying the action shall be appended to the statement of claim. This means that 
the creditor must also file with the court the contract constituting the basis for the claim: here is really the first 
chance for the court to assess the potentially unfair nature of a standard term. 
However, considering that the filing of an objection is not very burdensome for the consumer, it can be concluded 
that the rules of the order for payment procedure of Estonia are in compliance with the CJEU case law in situations 
where the unfairness of a standard term is not obvious to the court.  
On the other hand, the situation is different in cases where the court has serious doubts about the validity of 
standard terms. As was described previously regarding Profi Credit Polska S.A. (No. 2; Joined cases C-419/18 
and C-483/18 Profi Credit Polska S.A., 2019), in this situation court has to have a right to ask for additional 
documents from the creditor. The CCIP does not foresee such a right for the court. The Estonian order for payment 
procedure is formalised in a way that there has been no opportunity left for the court to ask the creditor for any 
additional evidence. The court has a chance to see the documents that form the basis of the claim only when the 
consumer has filed an objection. This contradiction between the regulation of the CCIP and the UCTD cannot be 
eliminated by interpreting the CCIP in light of the UCTD. The regulation on the order for payment procedure in 
the CCIP simply does not include an article that would allow for such an interpretation. Therefore, there is a need 
for the Estonian legislator to amend the order for payment procedure rules of the CCIP so that they would allow 
the court, in cases of serious doubts about the validity of standard terms, to order the creditor to submit additional 
evidence in the form of the contract that is the basis for the creditor’s claim.  
In the light of the recent Bondora case, the court’s right to ask for additional evidence might be even broader, 
meaning that the court should have such a right already when the credit contract is concluded between the creditor 
and the consumer and the court does not need to have any doubts about the fairness of the terms being used (see 
4.2.1.2). However, it has to be borne in mind that in Bondora the CJEU was analysing the Regulation No. 
1896/2006 and did not directly address the matters of national order for payment procedures. Therefore, it might 
be too early to make such a conclusion. 
As a conclusion to the previous discussion, the Estonian legislator should consider adding a paragraph to CCIP § 
483 stating that in case of a claim made by the seller or supplier arising from a consumer contract, the court has a 
right to demand submission of evidence in order to assess the possible unfairness of standard terms. The court’s 
right could be limited to cases where the court has serious doubts about the fairness of terms being used. This 
would keep the regulation of the CCIP in line with the practice of the CJEU. For granting even stronger protection 
to the consumers, the court’s right should not be limited only to cases of serious doubt. 
 
4 The consequence of filing an objection is that the hearing of the matter will continue by contentious proceedings which 
means that the court will also be obliged to assess the substance of the claim (CCIP § 483 [1]). 
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The first CJEU judgments concerning the possibility for a court to assess, ex officio, the unfair nature of standard 
terms in the order for payment procedure were already made several years ago. In the light of these judgments, 
Estonian legislators have introduced minor amendments to the CCIP, allowing the assistant judge who carries out 
the order for payment procedure to review, ex officio, only the arrangements concerning penalties for late payment 
contained in the standard terms of a consumer contract. Other standard terms’ unfairness can be assessed by 
Estonian courts only in cases where the assistant judge refers the making of a ruling on the matter to the judge 
under clause 595 (2) 3) of the CCIP. Consequently, pursuant to Estonian law, in case a standard term is evidently 
unfair and invalid, then in the course of the order for payment procedure the court has the opportunity to assess 
the unfairness of standard terms ex officio already, before making the proposal for payment. The respective 
regulation is in compliance with the positions of the CJEU expressed in the judgments on Banco Español de 
Crédito SA and Finanmadrid.  
If the unfair nature of a standard term is not immediately clear to a court and the court does not have serious doubts 
about the validity of contractual terms, the rules of the CCIP are also in compliance with the requirements specified 
by the CJEU in the cases Profi Credit Polska S.A. and PKO Bank Polski S.A., and need not be changed. The reason 
behind this is that it is relatively easy for the consumer to file an objection to the claim. 
However, in light of the positions of the CJEU in case Profi Credit Polska S.A. (No. 2), the CCIP needs to be 
amended. According to this ruling of the CJEU, in case of serious doubts about the validity of a standard term 
based on which the claim is made the court should have a right to ask for the relevant documents (the contract) 
from the creditor. At the moment, the CCIP does not foresee such a right for the court, and this gap cannot be 
overcome by interpreting the CCIP in line with the UCTD. The rules of the CCIP should be amended so that the 
court would have a right to ask for the documentation based on which the claim is made in the course of order for 
payment procedure.  
In the absence of the above, the order for payment procedure would not very effectively ensure the protection 
required under the UCTD. Namely, the petitioners almost never submit a contract or a specific condition 
underlying their claim to the court in their petition for the payment order. Furthermore, it does not derive from the 
CCIP that the court should require the petitioner to submit any documents proving the claim (even if in doubt 
about the fairness of terms being used). Also, the CJEU has not clearly found that the court should demand 
submission of the terms in order to determine potential invalidity of a standard term (see 4.2.2). Therefore, in 
many, if not most cases the potential unfairness would not be clear to an assistant judge, which in turn does not 
enable them to refer the making of the ruling to the judge. There is also very limited possibility for the court to 
develop serious doubts about the validity of standard terms being used by the creditors as the contract is simply 
not available to the court. Consequently, Estonian judges have no opportunity to assess, ex officio, the potentially 
unfair nature of the standard terms, and the consumer will be ordered to pay an amount of money based on an 
invalid standard term. This means that a seller or supplier may, in order to escape the review of the substance of 
the standard terms, find it expedient to assert its claims by the order for payment procedure instead of ordinary 
action. The Estonian experience shows further that the effective protection of consumers’ rights is hindered by the 
fact that, under the existing CJEU practice, the court does not have to demand submission of evidence, and sellers 
or suppliers can thus avoid the unfairness control of the standard terms very easily by not appending the respective 
evidence to the petition. Therefore the situation in Estonia could be improved by giving the court the right to 
demand submission of evidence even if it does not have serious doubts about the validity of the terms being used. 
In addition, the Estonian legislator should introduce a clear rule to CCIP § 483 (2) stating that the court, by order, 
denies a petition in expedited procedure for payment if the claim against a consumer arising from a consumer 
contract is based on an unfair contract term. This would grant the consumer the desired high level of protection 
and also make the procedural rules more unambiguous.  
In the light of the above, the current initiative in Estonia to make the order for payment procedure even more 
automated and left to artificial intelligence is not to be welcomed. It is certainly not just a post office duty, where 
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no justice has to be administered. Rather, according to the CJEU case law, the trend should be towards more 
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